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Abstract 
Using a contingent valuation survey, this research identifies villagers’ willingness 
to pay (WTP) towards the operation and maintenance of water treatment plants in 
eleven villages in Maharashtra with existing facilities. Preferences were elicited 
using three different payment mechanisms: 1) a monthly fee, 2) labor (time) 
contributions, and 3) a pay-per-container mechanism. Results show low levels of 
support for the pay-per-container scheme (51% stated positive WTP towards this 
option), whereas the communal mechanisms were more popular (86.7% and 
87.3% stated positive contributions). This study concludes that the long-term 
viability of water treatment in Maharashtra is weak, as few scenarios provide 
adequate revenue to properly operate and maintain the infrastructure.  
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Geogenic contamination of drinking water is a major health issue in India, which relies 
heavily on groundwater supplies, most of which were developed to tackle problems of 
fecal contamination. High levels of naturally-occurring fluoride in the groundwater 
makes India one of the countries most impacted by fluoride-contaminated water, with 
contamination prevalent in 20 states across the country (National Health Portal India, 
2016). Treatment to remove fluoride is typically costly due to the need for regular 
maintenance, active operation of treatment technologies, regular replacement of parts, 
and other associated costs such as electricity supply for certain technologies. In rural 
areas, these costs may pose a significant barrier to the provision of safe, fluoride-free 
drinking water. In the state of Maharashtra, where this study is based, the regional 
government initially provides financial support towards the implementation and 
operation of communal rural treatment plants (discussed in Section 2); however, the aim 
is to move towards ‘demand-driven’ systems that are financed by users in the long term 
(World Bank, 2010, 2014). This mirrors similar shifts towards user-based financing of 
water provision taking place across the developing world (OCED, 2011; Rogers, De 
Silva, & Bhatia, 2002).  
Identifying user preferences (i.e. willingness to pay) for water treatment is therefore a 
critical question, as this will help determine whether there is demand for water 
treatment and whether the costs of operation and maintenance of rural treatment 
systems can be covered by user fees. For example, we estimate (Section 6) a fluoride 
water treatment facility with between 500-3000 L of tank volume would cost 
approximately 92-300 Indian rupees (INR) to operate every day. Given this range of 
costs, it is essential to identify the perceived benefits of fluoride-free water to rural 




treated water, then the continued deployment of these treatment plants around fluoride-
affected villages may not be economically viable.  
However, user-financed systems may take different forms entailing quite different 
payment mechanisms and water access options, which may affect acceptability and 
preferences. On the one hand, there are community-owned water facilities in which all 
users contribute regular payments towards upkeep and management; access to water in 
these models is largely open to all and there are generally no restrictions on the amount 
each household can consume. This is the approach currently promoted in Maharashtra. 
An alternative model that is gaining support across the developing world including 
India involves pay-per-use systems. Access to water via this model is restricted to those 
who pay, and the amount consumed is determined by payment amount.  
Despite growing popularity, to the best of our knowledge there have been no studies 
identifying acceptability or preferences associated with pay-per-use schemes. Most 
studies investigate attitudes of consumers for water free from geogenic contamination, 
typically focusing choices between two sources, neither of which require payment 
(Huber & Mosler, 2012; Inauen, Hossain, Johnston, & Mosler, 2013; Madajewicz et al., 
2007; Mosler, Blochliger, & Inauen, 2010; Van Geen et al., 2002). Only one study has 
been identified that estimates WTP for the treatment of fluoride-contaminated drinking 
water; however, it narrowly focuses on a specific treatment technology researched by 
the group conducting the study, which limits its generalizability to other contexts (Roy 
& Chakraborty, 2014), .   
The present study adds to this limited literature by identifying WTP for the treatment of 
fluoride-contaminated water in rural villages in the state of Maharashtra provided via 




involve, i) identifying acceptability of and preferences for treated water associated with 
pay-per-use schemes, ii) a comparative analysis of acceptability and preferences for 
communal versus pay-per-use schemes, and iii) identifying the economic feasibility of 
different rural drinking water treatment models. To do this, we estimate preferences 
using three different scenarios and associated payment mechanisms: two of which are 
associated with ‘communal’ systems, and the third associated with the pay-per-use 
system. 
The first mechanism, modelled on the current approach used in Maharashtra, involves a 
communal scheme which provides water to everyone, and which requires monthly 
payments by all households. This type of scheme may be considered a quasi-public 
good, in which there may be congestion issues at peak times of day, but which, for the 
most part, is non-excludable and potentially subject to free riding. Successful communal 
systems typically depend on collective action, policing within the community, and 
punishment of non-contributing households to sustain financial contributions over time. 
Despite these hurdles, community-based water treatment technologies are the favored 
water provision approach of the reform policy in India (Brunner, Lele, Starkl, & 
Grassini, 2010).  
The second mechanism takes into account that villagers may hold positive values for 
communally-managed water treatment plants, and yet are unable or unwilling to make 
monetary contributions. This might occur if there are constraints on cash availability – 
such as in low-income and subsistence communities (e.g. O’Garra, 2009). In these 
situations, contributions of labor time might serve as a viable alternative to monetary 
contributions (e.g. O’Garra, 2009; Gibson et al., 2016). Indeed, it is common practice in 




social and community schemes; examples include Vietnam (Glewwe, Agrawal and 
Dollar, 2014), Fiji (O’Garra, 2009) and Rwanda (Kalisa, 2014). Thus, the second 
mechanism used to identify preferences for water treatment, involves contributions of 
time towards the operation and maintenance of the water treatment plant. Willingness-
to-work for water provision has been examined in Abramson et al. (2011) and Vasquez 
(2014); in both studies, derived welfare values from labor-contributions were 
comparable to those derived from monetary contributions, suggesting both mechanisms 
might provide realistic options for users to pay for water.  
The third mechanism involves the ‘pay-per-use’ scheme in which villagers pay for each 
container of water collected. Treated water is thus privatized in that it is only accessible 
to those who pay, and the amount provided is proportional to the amount paid. This 
demand-driven approach to water provision first appeared in Indian water development 
policies in the early 2000s (Vandana, 2013); however, it is the recent rise in popularity 
of water ATMs across India (Aiyappa, 2014; Gupta, 2014; Kapoor, 2015; Press Trust of 
India, 2014; TNN, 2016) that makes evaluation of user acceptance of and WTP for 
these schemes especially relevant. This “new” model of water delivery is similar to the 
familiar water kiosk model popular throughout Asia and Africa, which is marketed as 
giving the economically poor more choice and control as water is purchased by volume 
as needed (Collignon & Vézina, 2000; Opryszko, Huang, Soderlund, & Schwab, 2009). 
Contributions to this type of scheme may reflect the preferences of individuals with low 
levels of trust in others or in the ability of the community to successfully manage the 
communal treatment plant. It may also reflect preferences of those who particularly 
value excluding potential free-riders. There has been extensive debate in the literature 
about the merits and challenges of pay-per-use water schemes, with concerns about the 




McGranahan Asia, America, & McGranahan, 2003; Zaki & Amin, 2009); yet, there are 
many different organizational models to the ATM/kiosk ranging from privately-owned 
to community ownership and management of the resource.  Our aim here is to identify 
acceptance levels and preferences for treated water from a volume-based purchasing 
approach, which essentially represents a private good. 
As noted, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to identify preferences for 
a pay-per-use model of drinking water provision. Given the increasing popularity of this 
provision model, and the extensive debate about its potential benefits, the estimation of 
attitudes towards and preferences for this type of water provision approach represents a 
significant contribution to the literature and to the policy debate on rural water 
provision.   
By identifying and comparing preferences elicited under these three different 
mechanisms we can assess the feasibility of different provision mechanisms for rural 
drinking water treatment plants.  Given the low success rate of water treatment and 
reliable service delivery in India (Pattanayak, Yang, Whittington, & Bal Kumar, 2005; 
Pierce, 2017; Zérah, 2000) –and around the world (Etmannski & Darton, 2012; Inauen 
et al., 2013)– these findings represent a critical input into policy-decisions regarding 
how best to secure long-term success of water treatment systems in rural communities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 describe the background 
to the study, the location, and the methodologies of the research. Section 4 details the 
survey population characteristics, including attitudes and knowledge regarding water, 
fluoride contamination, and the installed water treatment units. Section 5 reports user 
preferences for treated water by the three major payment schemes discussed above.  




Section 7 to evaluate the economic viability of these technologies. Finally, we present 
conclusions to our research in Section 8.  
 
2. Description of study site 
In India, the government limits fluoride to a threshold of 1.0 mg/L F with a secondary 
permissible limit of 1.5 mg/L F when no other source is available (BIS IS-10500). In 
Maharashtra, some rural locations contain concentrations in excess of 5 and even 
13 mg/L (Duraiswami & Patankar, 2011; Madhnure, Sirsikar, Tiwari, Ranjan, & Malpe, 
2007). Of Maharashtra’s 35 districts, six contain 133 of the most impacted villages, 
with the largest cluster in Yavatmal (see Table S 1 in Supplementary Information) 
where this study is based. 
Unfortunately, fluorosis has no direct cure; avoidance or development of defluoridation 
treatment are the only mitigation approaches. The Maharashtrian Government considers 
treatment as the last method of action in combatting fluoride in a community, 
exhausting other options such as availability of alternate sources and the feasibility of 
supplying piped water prior to implementing a treatment scheme (Andey et al., 2013; 
Government of Maharashtra, 2011). When there are no alternative sources and no 
immediate potential for piped water, the government issues 3-5 year contracts to a 
private company to build and maintain a defluoridation treatment facility in the 
community. After this initial period, the treatment facilities are then turned over to the 
communities. This handover process is part of recent policy reforms aimed at moving 
many development decisions to the Gram Panchayat (village council) level. Examples 
of such policy reforms include the Government of India Sector Reform Pilot 




Gramodaya Yojana-Rural Drinking Water Programme (PMGY Programme) (initiated 
in 2000), and the World Bank-aided Jalswarajya Project (initiated in 2003) 
(Government of India, 2007). The transfer includes moving responsibility regarding 
planning, implementation, operation, and maintenance to the village level.  
We conducted our study in eleven villages (Figure 1) located in the district of 
Yavatmal, in the state of Maharashtra, which, as noted, has one of the highest 
concentrations of villages with fluoride-contaminated water sources in the region. The 
selected villages met the following criteria: (1) they contain identical technologies 
(electrocoagulation) for fluoride treatment, and (2) the water treatment facilities were in 
the process of being turned over from government-subsidized private companies to the 
communities between October-December 2014. These criteria ensured technical 
differences in the operation and maintenance of the treatment plants, and differences 
associated with the timing of the transition from government-subsidized to community-
owned water treatment systems were controlled for, and would not represent a source of 
variation in the study.  
 
[Figure 1: Location of 11 project villages within the Yavatmal District in eastern 
Maharashtra.] 
 
3. Materials and methods 
3.1 Survey design 
To estimate preferences for treated drinking water in each of the research villages, we 
used a contingent valuation (CV) survey (Bateman et al., 2002). The CV question was 




water sources, quantity of water collected, and perceived quality of drinking water;  2) 
household and individual practices relating to WASH indicators (water, sanitation, 
hygiene); 3) knowledge about fluoride, fluorosis, illnesses from drinking water and 
general WASH knowledge; 4) knowledge about the function of the defluoridation water 
treatment plant and the role of the community in managing it; 5) WTP for fluoride-
treated water per month (WTPm), and per container (WTPc) and willingness to 
contribute time (WTcT) as an in-kind contribution, and finally, 6) socio-economic 
information.   
To dispel fears of exclusion and corruption, the WTP question was embedded in a 
scenario which stressed everyone in the village, including women, were important for 
the water committee to succeed; additionally, we asked respondents to assume the water 
committees were fair, honest and responsible (see Supplementary Information for more 
details). 
Preferences for fluoride-treatment facilities were then elicited via three different 
payment schemes, in the following order: 1) per month monetary contributions 
(WTPm), 2) per container monetary contributions (WTPc), and 3) daily contributions of 
time (WTcT). A binary response filter was used for each payment mechanism to 
identify those willing to pay towards the water treatment plant. Those who indicated a 
positive WTP, were asked to select their preferred contribution using a payment ladder 
approachi (Bateman et al., 2002). This involved asking respondents to choose their 
maximum WTP or willingness to contribute time (WTcT) from a series of amounts read 
out by the interviewer, starting at zero and increasing by discrete amounts to a 
maximum. The maximum values presented to respondents were as follows: 300 rupees 




WTcT mechanism. In all three cases respondents were capable of pledging more money 
or time as a “more” category was included on the ladder as well.  
At the time of our survey, households had not yet started contributing towards their 
water treatment plants.  These were either still under government contract, or the first 
payment had yet not been charged. Therefore, we expect no bias in terms of experience 
making payments. 
We note that, in the pay-per-container (WTPc) scenario, the water source is presented as 
a community good owned and operated by the community, with the difference being 
that individuals can only extract a specific volume per payment. We opted to use this 
particular scenario rather than a company-owned scheme to avoid introducing 
additional sources of variation in the scenario in comparison to the other scenarios. 
Attitudes towards company-ownership would likely influence WTP for water treatment, 
and we mainly wanted to explore preferences for a privatized resource. Additionally, 
the policy in Maharashtra is specifically to deploy community-based treatment plants, 
hence our scenario adhered to this model of water treatment. We acknowledge the 
limitations of this scenario in terms of providing specific guidance about WTP for 
company-owned pay-per-container schemes; our approach focuses on preferences for 
access and payment options, and future studies could focus on preferences for different 
providers of treated water. 
Reasons for non-payment were elicited after the valuation section (see Supplementary 
Information).  The entire valuation scenario is included in the Supplementary 





3.2 Data Collection 
Overall, 455 surveys each lasting 30 min on average were administered across the 
survey villages from 15-27 November 2014. These were conducted in Marathi by 
enumerators from the Vidarbha region, who had been trained over the course of a day 
and a half, including half a day of training in the field. The survey was administered on 
an electronic survey platform using the Open Data Kit application for android phones. 
The sample of households were selected using a random transect walk (Bennett, Woods, 
Liyanage, & Smith, 1991) in each village originating from the water treatment plant 
with each enumerator walking a different route. Participants in the survey were required 
to be an adult (18 years or older) who self-identified as a water collector for the 
household. Specifically, potential respondents were asked: “Can I speak to a head of the 
household who collects drinking water for the household?” Although females typically 
constitute the majority (82.7%) of primary water collectors in rural Indian households 
(IIPS and Macro International, 2007), we framed the initial filter question to broaden 
the gender inclusion in our survey, and thus account for the attitudes, knowledge and 
preferences of all water collectors, whether male or female.  
A total of 31 surveys contained incomplete information and were therefore removed 
from survey analysis, resulting in a final sample of 424 respondents.  
 
4. Sample Description 
4.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Key socio-economic characteristics of respondents and their households are 
summarized in Table 1. Results show most of the sample was female (56%). However, 




primary drinking water collector for the household. Thus, females were identified as the 
primary water collector in 60% of surveyed households, whilst males were identified as 
the primary collectors in 40% of households. This proportion of male water collectors is 
significantly higher than the population proportion of 10.7% for all of rural India, as per 
IIPS and Macro International (2007). However, India-wide average statistics may 
obscure local-level variation in water collection practices.  
Notably, Yavatmal is classed as one of the country’s most backward districts (National 
Institute of Rural Development, 2009), and as such, water collection activities may 
differ from those in more affluent regions. As can be observed in Table 1, the mean 
household income of our sample is significantly lower (two-tailed t-test: p-
value=0.0001) than the average 5,289 INR for Yavatmal, indicating the villages in our 
study are particularly low-income. There is evidence that as a household becomes more 
economically poor, the likelihood of women being economically active increases 
(Blumberg, 2017). Additionally, in rural agricultural areas of India, men are more likely 
to engage in inconsistent day-laborer work as it pays a higher wage for men than it does 
for women (Bardhan, 2014; Desai & Jain, 1994).  This, therefore, leaves many men 
home in the household while the female works the local field, conceivably creating an 
increased need for shared water responsibilities in these households. Closer inspection 
of our results confirms the households with men as water collectors are within the lower 
reported household income brackets with 75% of these households earning monthly 
incomes of less than 3500 INR. Thus, the distribution of water collection tasks in our 
sample may be explained by the need for shared water responsibilities among males and 
females in very low-income households. 
We also note that the results from this study may not generalise to the more affluent 




commented on above. Thus, findings from this study will be mostly relevant to lower-
income villages and households.   
 
[Table 1: Survey respondent socio-economic characteristics] 
 
Results also show  approximately 13.9 % of the respondent sample has achieved higher 
education; however, the literacy level is less than the district average of 75.8-82.8% 
(depending on the source) (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2015; International 
Institute of Population Studies (IIPS), 2015).   
Most households engage in agriculture as their primary source of income either as 
landowners growing crops on their own land (68%) or as laborers without 
landownership (29%). Interestingly, although most households (66%) have electricity 
and own a television, only 35% have a personal latrine on the household premise, 
closely matching the statistic (31%) for the region. This disparity between television 
and latrine ownership may reflect different costs associated with installing and 
maintaining televisions versus latrines in these villages; unfortunately, we did not 
collect data on these costs, so we cannot verify latrines are more expensive than 
televisions. However, the low levels of latrine ownership may also result from 
insufficient knowledge about the importance of sanitation. In the following section we 
report attitudes and behaviors relating to basic water and hygiene (WASH) 
characteristics; these are factors we expect will influence preferences for treated 





4.2 Water Collection and WASH Characteristics and Attitudes 
 Basic WASH characteristics are summarized in Figure 2. Villagers use either 
purchased water (source unknown) (13.7%) or groundwater sources (86.3%) accessed 
by various methods (e.g. community tap, tubewell, water treatment plant, private tap). 
Most households (60.4%) use a community water source as their primary drinking water 
source and 43% use the treatment plant on a regular or occasional basis. The total 
reported number of liters collected per day for drinking and cooking only, ranged 
between 4 liters-500 liters per household with an average of 44.4L per household and 
7.7 liters per capita (lpc), well within the water minimums needed for daily drinking and 
cooking (5.5-15 lpd per person). Estimated lpc values greater than 20 lpc (9 households) 
most likely include uses other than for cooking and drinking in their collection values, 
but were included in the analyses (WWAP, 2015).   
Results in Figure 2 indicate basic WASH needs are not being met in many of these 
communities.  Only 35% of households have a latrine on the premise and only 65% 
self-reported using soap to wash their hands. Many claim to perform some form of 
water treatment at home (38.9%), however most (84.8%) of this treatment includes 
passing water through a cloth as a filter.  This method of household treatment could 
easily increase the concentration of microbes in household water depending on the 
cleanliness of the cloth and the handling methods employed. In fact, of the household 
purification methods used, only a home reverse osmosis (RO) unit or the addition of 
chemicals could potentially reduce fluoride concentrations.  
 
[Figure 2: WASH Characteristics] 
 




reporting it was both of good quality and taste while only 3% thought it was poor in 
both of these categories. Furthermore, most respondents (71%) do not feel like the 
quality is changing for better or worse (see Supplementary Information, Table S 2). 
 
4.4 Knowledge of Fluoride and Defluoridation Treatment Plant   
Results in Figure 3 show that very few respondents recognized fluorosis symptoms 
presented  in pictures (31.4%) and of those recognizing the symptoms, only about half 
were aware that fluoride in the water was the cause (see Supplementary Information for 
more details).. This is a very surprising finding given that as part of the National 
Programme for Prevention and Control of Fluorosis in the 11th Five Year Plan extensive 
community outreach was reported. This plan includes a list of nine outreach activities to 
be carried out throughout the district, including daily TV and radio announcements, 
local performances throughout the year, the distribution and posting of informational 
posters, and district level seminars with doctors and practitioners (GOI, 2014). Evidence 
from our study suggests this outreach program failed to increase awareness about 
fluorosis or fluoride contamination in these villages.  
We note however, that only 10.1% of the survey population reported having a family 
member suffering from visible skeletal or dental fluorosis, which might partly explain 
the low awareness levels. However, fluorosis can also manifest as joint pain in older 
individuals, which was not captured by the survey. If fluorosis symptoms were more 
evident among villagers, it is likely that awareness levels would be higher.  
After the first series of questions, respondents were informed about fluoride, fluorosis, 
and the functions of the local treatment plant. This was followed by information about 




treatment plant would be transferred to community-ownership (see Supplementary 
Information). Results show that only 17% of the respondents actually knew about this 
handover; again confirming that current outreach and information programs in these 
villages are severely lacking, as noted above. Perhaps most strikingly, of the 29 
respondents that were either members of the GP or had a family member in the 
household that was part of the GP, only 11 knew the treatment plants were being 
handed over to the community. This indicates the lack of awareness among the villagers 
may not be due to a lack of communication at the village level between the GP and the 
residents, but rather, appears to occur at the point of contact between district officers 
and the GP. Clearly, community outreach as currently implemented is not working. In 
the absence of knowledge about the purpose of their local water treatment plant, 
villagers will have no incentive to collectively manage this shared resource. It is also 
possible that villagers do not value fluoride-free water, independent of awareness levels. 
Our study will help to clarify this question.    
Finally, respondents were asked: “How likely do you think it is that the community will 
successfully take over the operation and maintenance of the water treatment system 
without the private company?” Despite having no prior knowledge about the hand-over, 
43% of the survey population felt the handover would be successful. We expect that 
WTP or willingness to contribute time towards local water treatment plants will be 
influenced by the perceived likelihood of success. 
 
[Figure 3: Fluoride and defluoridation treatment plant knowledge characteristics] 
 
5. Willingness to Pay or Contribute Time for Water Treatment 




operation of their local water treatment plant, using three scenarios. Table 2 presents 
summary WTP statistics for the three payment scenarios (histograms of values and 
explanation of outlier identification are available in the Supporting Information). 
Analysis of the zero contribution responses show that protest responses accounted for 
6.6% and 4% of the WTPm and WTcT mechanisms respectively, while 13.9% of zero 
WTPc amounts were classes as protests (see discussion of protest responses in the 
Supporting Information).  
Results show that approximately 87% of respondents were willing to make positive 
contributions of money (WTPm) or time (WTcT) towards the communally-accessible 
water treatment plant, whereas only 52.1% were willing to make a positive contribution 
towards the pay-per-container scheme (WTPc). A Chi squared test of proportions shows 
that the difference between WTPm/WTcT and WTPcis highly significant (p<0.000). 
Thus, our results indicate low levels of acceptance of the pay-per-container scheme. 
This is very interesting since pay-per-container schemes, such as water ATMs, are 
being deployed across rural India amid claims of growing popularity amongst users 
(Aiyappa, 2014; Gupta, 2014; Kapoor, 2015; Press Trust of India, 2014; TNN, 2016). 
Our preliminary findings suggest these claims may not be warranted. More research 
would be needed to identify acceptance levels among rural populations in other parts of 
the country. 
To gain some insight into why villagers are less likely to state a positive WTPc for the 
pay-per-container scheme, we analyze the main (non-protest) explanations provided by 
respondents who state zero WTPm, WTcT, or WTPc. We find that the main reasons 
provided for zero WTPc include: ‘I cannot afford it’ (n=136, 68%) and ‘I don’t think I 




reasons provided for zero WTPm and WTcT (n=17, 33% and n=3, 6%, respectively), 
the proportions selecting these reasons for non-payment to the WTPc scheme are 
noticeably higher. However, we would expect, if respondents struggle to pay for water 
under one scheme, then they would also struggle under another scheme. In other words, 
we would expect similar numbers of respondents choosing zero contributions under 
both monthly and pay-per-container schemes. Our results suggest these zero WTPc 
values may represent a rejection of the scheme itself rather than low preferences for 
fluoride-free water. Further analysis shows that affordability is selected as the primary 
explanation for zero WTPc by respondents in the two lowest income brackets. It thus 
appears that the pay-per-container scheme is perceived as unaffordable and rejected 
outright mostly by villagers in the lower income groups. Further research might explore 
perceptions of water ATMs amongst different income groups, with a focus on 
perceptions of fairness and justice of pay-per-container mechanisms. 
In the case of WTcT, the main reason provided by respondents who were not willing to 
contribute time toward the water treatment plant was, ‘I don’t have the time’ (n=37, 
68.5%) and this explanation was primarily associated with the lowest two income 
brackets (86.5% from the two lowest income brackets). This is interesting because labor 
contributions are often used in stated preference studies to identify the WTP of 
individuals who might highly value a resource but who cannot afford monetary 
payments (e.g. Abramson et al., 2011; O’Garra, 2009). In this case, it appears low 
income households are also time-constrained; in such contexts, where both time and 
money are limited, it would be useful to explore other potential numeraires that could be 
suitably used to capture preferences.  




not agree to the WTPc scenario, those that did pledged a significant portion of their 
income (11.9% on average).  If we compare the cumulative distribution functions for 
contributions under all scenarios as fractions of household incomes (see Figure S3a in 
Supplementary Information), WTPc is the steepest of all the scenarios.  Roughly 40% of 
respondents pledged more than 5% of their household income in the WTPc scenario 
while only approximately 10% of respondents pledged more than 5% of their income in 
the WTPm. The WTPc scenario is largely unaffordable for most of the population.  
Overall, results indicate the ‘public good’ scenarios (WTPm and WTcT) are more 
popular than the pay-per-use mechanism. We will identify and compare the 
determinants of preferences for these three different mechanisms using regression 
analyses in Section 0. This will allow us to identify the drivers of WTP or WTcT and to 
ascertain to what extent preferences for the different water schemes are motivated by 
the same factors.  
 
[Table 2: Willingness to Pay or Contribute Time Summary Statistics] 
 
5.1 Comparing and Aggregating Estimates 
To compare estimates, these time contributions were converted into common metrics 
and comparable scales. To convert WTcT amounts into economic estimates, we used 
wage and leisure rates of time. The wage rate was calculated by dividing reported 
household income (Table 3) by the number of adults in the house and by an assumed 
160 working hours per month (40 hours/week, 4 weeks/month) to achieve an hourly per 
person wage rate. This was then multiplied by the number of hours per day a person was 
willing to contribute and by 30 days to compute a monthly contribution. The leisure rate 




conversion methods used in O’Garra (2009).  
The second task involved converting WTPc values into monthly estimates. To do this, 
we take a conservative approach by assuming that the per-container scheme would 
mainly be used for drinking water (and not for cooking uses). Thus, to calculate the 
amount of drinking water that might be purchased per month from the pay-per-container 
scheme we assume that an adult requires 2 L/day (for drinking only) to sustain life 
(WHO, 2011) and a child 1.5 L/day, the number of adults and children within the 
household were multiplied by their respective volumes to get an approximate number of 
fluoride-free liters required per household per day. That volume was then divided by the 
20 L container size quoted in the survey during the payment scenario and rounded up to 
the nearest whole number.  This number of receptacles collected was multiplied by 30 
days and the midpoint payment value selected on the WTPc scale was used to calculate 
an estimated monthly expenditure using the WTPc method.  
Calculated daily, monthly, and annual contributions are presented in Table 3. Results 
show that, depending on the payment scheme used, WTP for water treatment plants 
ranges between 1.9% and 6.6% of household income (using mean values). This is 
comparable to findings in other studies of WTP for treated water (e.g. Abramson et al., 
2011; Pattanayak et al., 2005) or improved water sources (e.g. Echenique & Seshagiri, 
2009; Vasquez, 2014), and accords with the “5% rule of thumb” (McPhail, 1993).  
Welfare estimates from WTcT calculated using the leisure rate of time, are comparable 
to WTPm estimates, with both measures, on average, accounting for less than 3% of a 
household’s income. WTPc contributions represent the highest percentage of income at 
6.6%. This violates most measures of affordability which typically range between 1% -




Water Demand Research Team, 1993; USEPA, 2002). Yet, previous research has 
concluded households are willing to exceed these affordability measures when marginal 
improvements are made to quantity, quality, and pressure of the current water supply 
(Echenique & Seshagiri, 2009). Estimates from the WTPc scheme are quite different to 
those from the monthly mechanisms, as respondents are being asked for their 
preferences for a private good which only payees can access. Thus, preferences for the 
WTPc scheme may reflect other motivations that do not influence WTP or contribute 
time per month. For example, high WTPc values may reflect higher levels of distrust in 
the ability of the community to collectively manage the public good. Additionally, high 
WTPc values may indicate a lack of interest in becoming involved in resource planning 
as might be required for communally-managed schemes.  
 
[Table 3: Summary of average pledged household expenditures for each willingness to 
contribute scenario] 
6. Economic model 
6.1 Interval regression analysis 
We analyzed the determinants of mean WTP or WTcT using an interval regression 
model, which considers the interval nature of our data. The interval data model states 
that the probability that the true WTP of a respondent, with characteristics Y, lies in the 
interval [BIDL, BIDU] is given by  (BIDU | Y) -  (BIDL | Y), where WTP is assumed to 
follow a distribution with a standard normal cumulative distribution function (). A 
normal distribution was assumed for all three models, as it performed better than the 
more commonly-used lognormal distribution. The model is estimated using maximum 




Huppert, 1989).  Data was analyzed using Stata/IC.   
 Explanatory variables were expected to influence elicited preferences include: 
knowledge about fluorosis and fluoride-contamination; a firsthand experience with 
fluorosis in the family, perceptions of current water quality; and perceived ability to 
personally deal with fluoride exposure (via household purification and/or use of the 
defluoridation treatment plant).  Demographic variables that typically impact 
contributions to a public good include age (-), income (+), education (+), and gender 
(female=+) (Casey, Kahn, & Rivas, 2006; Polyzou, Jones, Evangelinos, & Halvadakis, 
2011).  We also expect, for the monthly mechanisms (WTPm and WTcT), preferences 
will be positively influenced (although at a decreasing rate) by the amount of water 
collected per household per day. For the WTPc mechanism we used a slightly different 
metric (number of containers required per day) as payments are directly tied to the 20L 
collection container of the scenario design.  We expect this influence to be negative, 
reflecting decreasing marginal benefits per container. Effects associated with the 
different villages are controlled for by including village dummies in the regressions. 
Results from the three regression models are presented in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4: Interval regressions on willingness to pay per for the three payment schemes: 
WTPm, WTcT, and WTPc ] 
 
Results in Table 4 show the determinants of preferences for the three schemes vary 
widely, and there is no one common influence on preferences across all schemes. This 
suggests that these scenarios are not perceived to be close substitutes for each other and, 




there are some commonalities.  For example, income has a significantly positive 
influence on WTP under both monetary mechanisms (WTPm and WTPc), as expected, 
whilst the ratio of children to adults in a household has a positive effect on both WTPm 
and WTcT. We will describe and compare results of these three models, focusing first 
on the influence of socio-economic characteristics and then on the influence of WASH 
characteristics and knowledge of fluoride on preferences.   
 
6.1.1 Impact of Socio-economic Characteristics 
Results in Table 4 show the socio-economic determinants of contributions to the three 
payment mechanisms are quite different. Thus, Hindu respondents from higher-income 
households with more children (compared to adult numbers) and higher levels of 
latrine-ownership have higher WTPm. Meanwhile, older respondents from households 
with more children prefer to contribute time (WTcT) towards the water treatment plant. 
And WTPc is higher among Hindu respondents who were born in the village and who 
are from higher-income, smaller households which contain a member of the village 
council amongst their number.  
These differences provide some insight into how respondents perceive of the different 
mechanisms and the underlying motivations for supporting and contributing towards 
each one. For example, both public good scenarios attract higher contributions of time 
or money from respondents in households with more children. This is an expected 
result, however, we might have anticipated this variable to also influence WTPc, yet 
this is not the case. Indeed, it appears preferences elicited under the WTPc scheme are 
influenced by factors unrelated to concerns about health (whether of adults or children), 




per-container scheme appear to be influenced mainly by inter-personal or governance 
related issues.  
As noted above, WTPc is positively influenced by the presence of a Gram Panchayat 
member in the household (this has no effect on preferences for the other schemes); this 
could reflect greater awareness amongst households with village council members of 
the limitations and challenges of organizing and enforcing monthly payments (or time 
contributions) for a public resource open to all. Alternatively, it may indicate a lack of 
interest in organizing payments and management of such a communal system. We also 
note village tenure has a positive influence on WTPc - and no influence on preferences 
for the public good schemes - which might indicate a willingness to exclude 
‘newcomers’ to the community who might be perceived as potential free-riders; 
however, this is purely speculative and we cannot confirm whether this is indeed the 
case. Further research on the interaction between trust, social cohesion, and water 
access will be vital to identify the implications for equitable access to water of the 
rapidly expanding implementation of water ATMs across India.  
Finally, willingness to contribute towards water treatment was no higher amongst 
females compared to males; this is unexpected as females are often found to be more 
concerned and hold higher preferences for clean water (Alfredo, Lawler, & Katz, 2014). 
Our results suggest preferences for treated water are not gendered. 
In the following section, we discuss the impacts of water collection, WASH, or fluoride 





6.1.2 Impact of water collection, WASH, and fluoride and treatment knowledge 
The following discussion will focus primarily on the two public-goods models, WTPm 
and WTcT. This is because, as noted above, none of the water collection, WASH, or 
fluoride-related knowledge variables were significant determinants of WTPc. As results 
show, households already using the treatment plant as the main source of drinking water 
would have a higher WTP (of INR17.15) to sustain the resource into the long-term (see 
Table 4). Additionally, a belief that the handover will be successful increases WTPm by 
INR10.75 per month.  The positive influence of both using the treatment facility as well 
as having confidence in its success post-handover suggests respondents were thinking 
about the WTPm contributions as a long-term investment in a resource. Households 
collecting high volumes of water per day are also poised to benefit the most, as reflected 
in the positive, significant impact of household water consumption on WTPm.  
Meanwhile, those who spend time using household treatment to treat their water are less 
willing to contribute time towards communal treatment. This is reasonable, as time 
spent at home purifying the water and time spent contributing towards the upkeep of the 
treatment plant may be considered close substitutes under certain conditions. We note, 
however, that most household purification conducted (86% use cloth filtration) would 
have no impact on the fluoride concentration of the water.  Although education outreach 
is supposedly conducted in these villages as part of the treatment facility 
implementation process, it is not effective at providing useful information that improves 
health-related behaviors, such as household purifiers.  
Results also show that recognition of fluorosis symptoms positively influenced WTcT. 
Over three-quarters of respondents recognizing fluorosis symptoms belong to the lowest 




“affordable” point of entry to accessing improved water. Interestingly, prior awareness 
of fluorosis symptoms and exposure to fluoride and fluorosis (measured through village 
tenure), had no significant impact on WTPm. Finally, experience of waterborne 
illnesses in the past year had no significant impact on WTPm.  
 
7. Economic sustainability 
Values obtained from different organizations in the area reported a wide range of costs, 
223-754 INR/day, to operate these electrocoagulation plants given yearly operation 
expenses (see Supporting Information for more details).  Considering only the 
proportion of each village’s population that would be willing to pay ([Table 2) and the 
average daily contributions estimated for the WTPm and WTPc scenarios (Table 3) as 
well as similar calculations for the median contributions per day, the critical community 
size is calculated for each payment scheme and presented in [Table 5.  [Table 5: 
Critical village population size to achieve cost recovery at two estimated daily operation 
values] 
 
Given the size distribution of our villages, two of the eleven are smaller than the critical 
village size for the WTPm payment scheme at the lowest cost projection.  The WTPc 
payment scheme requires a smaller village size to be economically viable, even given 
the low WTP potential.  However, both payment schemes would fail in most of our 
study villages if the technology costs closer to 755 INR/day to operate.  This estimated 
daily cost would requires 360-417 households in the WTPm scheme and 174-192 
households for WTPc, a size requirement only met by 1/11 and 6/11 villages 




to pay for treatment.  In the regression analyses, income was a factor on how much 
people were willing to pay in both the WTPm and WTPc scenarios.  A majority of 
households (80%) earn less than 5000 INR, 31% earning 1000 INR or less, with the 
average income for the entire sample at approximately 4000 INR.  Therefore, even 
though the WTPc scenario has a greater ability to meet the price recovery, the ability of 
a community to reach the quorum necessary to cover the daily expenses is more 
challenging.  
If we consider possible time contributions by villagers - particularly, lower-income 
households - towards the operation and management of the water treatment plant, then 
this may solve part of the finance problem. Operator salaries could be partly substituted 
with labor contributions by individuals from low-income households, which could 
potentially save 500-1200 rupees per month assuming 25% and 50% reductions in 
operator salaries (for corresponding reductions in labor time).   
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper reports results of a CV survey of preferences for communal water treatment 
plants in rural Maharashtra. Preferences were elicited using monthly monetary 
contributions, monthly time (labor) contributions and payments per-container. We find 
that respondents are willing to pay an average of 72.4 INR per month or contribute 1.3 
hours per day towards the operation and maintenance of the communal ‘public good’ 
version of the water treatment plant. Welfare estimates calculated from time 
contributions (WTcT) using the leisure rate of time are comparable to the amounts 
pledged in the WTPm scenario, with the former representing 1.9% and the latter 




of thumb’ which typically describes the maximum amount a rural subsistence household 
should pay for water (Fankhauser & Tepic, 2007; Sebri, 2015; The World Bank Water 
Demand Research Team, 1993; USEPA, 2002). 
Responses to the pay-per-container scheme (WTPc) however, were very different. 
Firstly, this payment mechanism was far less acceptable to respondents, with almost 
half the sample stating zero WTPc. In contrast, over 85% of respondents stated positive 
WTPm or WTcT values, suggesting a rejection of the privatization scenario. If 
respondents were indifferent to the per-container payment approach, then we would 
have expected similar proportions stating positive WTP, albeit adjusted downwards to 
account for household size and water consumption levels. This was not the case. 
Furthermore, despite the high proportion of zero WTP for the pay-per-container 
scenario, estimated monthly payments were significantly higher for this scheme 
(representing 6.6% of household income) than WTP estimated using the other payment 
mechanisms, 
This is a very important result as water ATMs are growing in popularity across India 
and political actors are moving towards implementing them within rural communities; 
yet, the acceptability of these schemes by the community remains largely unknown.  In 
addressing this research gap, we conclude that pay-per-container models of water 
provision may require different development and implementation strategies than the 
more commonly-used communal water treatment schemes used in many parts of the 
world, such as the Vidharba Region of Maharashtra.  Through analysis of the WTP 
survey responses and interval regression analyses, we conclude that the determinants of 
preferences for the WTPc scheme are quite different from those influencing preferences 




concerns about health and water play a significant role in determining preferences for 
treated water as a public good, whilst WTPc appears to be motivated by social concerns 
that are unrelated to water or health. Our findings also indicate that there is a 
widespread lack of awareness and knowledge regarding fluoride, fluorosis, and the 
functionality of the local treatment plants. This raises concerns regarding the actual 
implementation of the outreach and educational schemes outlined in the water 
development policy. In the absence of knowledge about the role of the local water 
treatment plant, it cannot be expected that local residents will contribute time or money 
towards operation and maintenance. Thus, more work needs to be done to inform local 
villagers about development projects being implemented in their communities, if this 
investment is actually to result in health improvements and associated economic 
development. Finally, using these estimated values, we identified the economic viability 
of the larger-scale deployment of communal water treatment plants across the state. Our 
findings show that the long-term economic viability of the electrocoagulation treatment 
plants implemented in these communities is tenuous.  Clearer cost delineation related to 
these treatment plants are required as well as more detailed accounting of actual 
payments made to village operators versus reported values by contract companies. 
Using the range of potential daily costs to successfully operate the treatment plant and 
the monetary contributions from the contingent valuation survey, some villages are 
unable to meet the lowest cost scenarios.  These villages are likely to be unsuccessful in 
maintaining daily operation of their treatment plant without additional financial 
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[Figure 1: Location of 11 project villages within the Yavatmal District in eastern Maharashtra.] 
[Figure 2: WASH Characteristics] 
[Figure 3: Fluoride and defluoridation treatment plant knowledge characteristics] 
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[Table 4: Interval regressions on willingness to pay per for the three payment schemes: WTPm, WTcT, 
and WTPc ] 




Table 1: Survey respondent socio-economic characteristics 
Figures in parenthesis () are standard deviations; **13 refused to answer, missing values were 
imputed using the *average income for the village, income taken as mid-interval of 
income categories; a This figure is from the 2001 Census; b Statistics for Maharashtra, year 
2005-6. Source: IIPS (2007); c Source: MIDC (2012) ‘Maharashtra Districts’; d Statistics 
for 2001. Source: UNICEF/ via http://knoema.com/INDAT2012/india-development-
indicators-2012 





Gender (% female) 55.9 48.8  
Average age  36.5 (0.67) n.d. 
Highest education level (%)   
No schooling  29.3 n.d. 
Primary schooling (grade 1-4)  16.8 n.d. 




% of respondents that can read and write 62.5 75.8 – 82.8  
% of respondents always lived in this village 68.9 n.a. 
% Hindu religion 90.3 81 a 
Household characteristics    
Household size (mean number of people) 6.3 (0.14) 4.7 c 




Gross monthly household income (mean, INR)* 4,090 (3993) 5,289 b 
% landowners growing crops on own land 68%  
% laborers without land ownership 29%  
% latrine on premises 35.4 31.2 c 
%  Households with water source on premises 23.6 24.0 d 
% of households that own a television 65.8 n.d. 
% of households with electricity 66.0 70.0 c 









Table 2: Willingness to Pay or Contribute Time Summary Statistics 
    
Summary statistics (n=424) ₹/month a  hrs/day ₹/container 
Willingness to pay > 0 (% of sample) 86.7 87.3 52.1 
Willingness to pay = 0, protest (% protests in 
sample) 
6.6 4.0 13.9 
Mean WTP (s.d.) (INR or hours) †* 72.4 (56.0) 1.3 (0.81) 7.7 (11.4) 
Median WTP (INR or hours) †* 62.5  1.5  7.5  
Minimum/Maximum (INR or hours)* 0/500 0/6.5 0/100 
Average conditional WTP (WTP>0) (s.d.)* (INR 
or hours) 
77.9 (54.3) 1.4 (0.74) 14.1 (12.1) 
Median conditional WTP (WTP>0)* (INR or 
hours) 
62.5 1.5 12.5 
Number of outliers (percent of population)  1 (0.2%) 2 (0.5) 47 (11.1%) 
Number of respondents †* 394 405 318 
† protests excluded; *payment outliers excluded; a one respondent did not answer this question  
 
Table 3: Summary of average pledged household expenditures for each willingness to 
contribute scenario 






WTP per day a 2.4 7.7 2.6 8.3 
WTP per month b 72.4 232.0 77.3 249.3 
WTP per year c 868.9 2784.5 928.2 3033.1 
Average % of HH 
income 
2.8 5.8 1.9 6.6 
*no protests, no outliers; a for WTPm and WTcT scenarios, WTP per day calculated 
using WTP per month and dividing by 30; b WTPc values were multiplied by 30 days. c 
WTP per month multiplied by 12 for all payment scenarios; †Conservative estimates of 
drinking water only needs (2 L/day for adults and 1.5 L/day for children) were used in 





Table 4: Interval regressions on willingness to pay per for the three payment schemes: WTPm, WTcT, and WTPc 
 WTPm  WTcT  WTPc   
 β (se) β (se) β (se) 
Socio-economic Characteristics       
Gender (1= female) 3.275 5.448 -0.068 0.086 1.603 1.161 
Age 0.002 0.198 0.009*** 0.003 -0.018 0.043 
Education (higher secondary and above=1, all others=0) -3.816 7.514 0.068 0.121 1.314 1.641 
Village tenure (1=always lived in this village, 0=all others) 6.700 5.833 -0.029 0.090 2.469* 1.274 
Religion (1=Hindu, 0=all others) 18.47** 9.183 0.055 0.147 4.143* 2.174 
Household child ratio (children/household count) 37.70*** 13.820 0.702*** 0.217 -2.179 2.968 
Household size (consistently living in household) -0.721 0.947 0.016 0.015 -0.580** 0.279 
Reported monthly income (missing values imputed) 
(INR/1000) 2.94*** 0.684 0.016 0.011 0.631*** 0.138 
Households with a latrine on premises 13.37** 6.322 0.110 0.099 0.808 1.332 
Household contains a member of the Gram Panchayat (1=yes) 14.640 10.320 0.091 0.161 5.124** 2.260 
Water Collection and WASH Characteristics       
Reported liters per day collected per household 0.260*** 0.059 0.000 0.001 ---  
Estimated number of 20L containers required (WTPc 
scenario) ---  ---  4.175 2.963 
Use of treatment plant as primary source (1=treatment plant, 
0=all others) 17.15** 8.568 -0.075 0.124 2.041 1.797 
Use a household purification system 1.215 5.763 -0.246*** 0.091 -0.440 1.241 
Household member had a waterborne illness in past year 
(1=yes) -6.458 6.765 0.165 0.105 1.635 1.402 
Rate water quality as good  (1=good, 0=all other ratings) -14.33** 5.711 -0.047 0.090 -1.223 1.202 




Recognize dental and skeletal fluorosis images (1=yes, 0=no) 1.412 6.693 0.187* 0.103 -1.337 1.403 
Feel the handover process will be successful (1=yes, 0=no) 10.75** 5.201 0.126 0.083 0.532 1.097 
village dummies included (eleven)       
constant -10.920 19.040 0.308 0.300 -1.478 4.430 
N 386  397  318  






[Table 5: Critical village population size to achieve cost recovery at two estimated daily 
operation values] 
 223 INR/day 755 INR/day 
WTPm (avg) 106 360 
WTPm (med) 123 417 
WTPc (avg) 52 174 
WTPc (med) 57 193 
 
ENDNOTES 
i There are different types of elicitation method in contingent valuation, the main ones being 
dichotomous choice (DC), and payment ladders. The payment ladder approach has been found 
to have advantages over DC because it less susceptible to anchoring and ‘yea-saying’ 
(Soeteman, van Exel and Bobinac, 2017; Zhongmin et al., 2006; Champ et al., 2003) and is 
cognitively less-demanding (Ready, Navrud & Dubourg, 2001). 
 
                                                 
